Ukrainian forces will struggle to regain initiative

Despite both sides making some progress on the frontline, neither side appears capable of a decisive breakthrough.

Ukrainian armed forces in August launched a ground offensive into Russia’s Kursk region and occupied a substantial amount of territory. Kyiv has used the initial success of this operation to create a positive new narrative to replace the previously dominant characterisation of the war as having shifted in Russia’s favour. The attack on Kursk galvanised external support for Ukraine and boosted morale among troops and the wider population.

Two and a half years after Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the war continues in what can be termed a steady state. Although each side might gain occasional advantages, there is little prospect in the short term that either side can achieve a large-scale and decisive breakthrough.

A lost opportunity for Russia?

When Ukraine’s 2023 summer ground offensive faltered, Russia was in a position to capitalise on its outstanding defensive performance.

Moscow reinforced its larger forces, albeit often with units filled with new recruits, and conducted offensives across the frontline, seeking to convert its superiority in numbers into territorial gains that could have undermined Kyiv’s control and confidence.

However, despite making some progress in isolated areas of the front line in the Donbas, it was unable to achieve a decisive breakthrough.

Notably, the capture of Avdiivka in February 2024, after four months of intense fighting, came at a high cost. The assault on the city involved over 40,000 troops and resulted in the loss of as many of 16,000 dead. Nevertheless, Russia’s success in seizing Avdiivka and subsequent expansion of control in areas west of the city shaped perceptions that Moscow had regained momentum in the war.

Russia continued its offensive in the following months, focusing on the Donbas cities of Toretsk and Pokrovsk. The Russian air force’s growing use of large glide bombs to destroy fortified defensive positions helped with these attacks.

This grinding assault made only incremental gains. Although Russian forces continued to advance in the face of stiff opposition, it revealed Russia’s inability to press home its numerical advantages in manpower and munitions.

Moscow’s modest advances came at enormous cost. Russian forces continued to suffer from highly centralised and rigid command and control structures, which have reduced battlefield flexibility and made manoeuvre difficult.

Beyond the battlefield, Russia continued its campaign of missile and aerial drone strikes on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, destroying as much as 50% of its pre-war power generation capacity. These attacks intensified at the end of August.

Ukrainian successes

Kyiv’s central success has been preserving its sovereignty by defending against larger and better-equipped forces for over 30 months. Even in the fiercely contested eastern Donbas region, where Russian forces have made some modest progress, there have been very few significant changes along the 1,000-kilometre frontline since the end of 2022.

Ukrainian forces have also achieved some other successes beyond the main theatre of combat in the Donbas.

The destruction of one-third of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is perhaps the most spectacular achievement, even if the number of Russian cruise missile-launching vessels remains significant.

Using a mixture of cheap naval drones and expensive UK-supplied Storm Shadow cruise missiles, Ukraine forced the Fleet to withdraw most of its naval assets to Novorossiysk, reducing its influence over the Black Sea. This has enabled Ukraine to increase seaborne exports, a key strategic gain.

Kyiv has largely neutralised Russian forces in Crimea, partially through the elimination of the Black Sea Fleet, but also through a combination of aerial assaults on targets on the peninsula and attacks on the two supply routes through southern Ukraine and the Kerch Bridge. As a result, what could have been a fixed ‘aircraft carrier’ for Russia has seen two of five air bases entirely taken out of action and the others unable to function effectively.

Ukraine has also launched ever bolder and more extensive aerial attacks inside Russia. After exercising extreme caution in the early months following Moscow’s full-scale invasion, these attacks have successfully struck both military targets and military-related industrial targets, such as oil facilities.

Ukraine’s limitations

Despite these successes, Kyiv faces considerable challenges.

Where Ukraine has made gains in ground combat, these have come through largely local, lower-level initiatives. Lower-level initiatives allow the army to outmanoeuvre more rigid Russian forces, but as the failed 2023 offensive revealed, it has yet to develop the capability for rapid manoeuvre and focused firepower at pace and scale against entrenched defences.

Although air defences have blunted Russia’s larger and better-equipped air force, Kyiv continues to lack sufficient capabilities to ensure the security of its airspace, leaving the way open for continued Russian blows to critical infrastructure.

One of Kyiv’s biggest problems is a manpower shortage. It does not have a large enough population to match the mass of the Russian military, which is one reason why the Ukrainian military has relied on innovation, flexibility, speed and manoeuvre to stay in the fight.

However, if the existing obstacles to conscription were overcome, Ukraine could field a larger armed force. One key constraint is that the conscription age is 25 — lowered from 27 in April 2024 — meaning that the most able-bodied are not recruited. Furthermore, many of those eligible are evading conscription, fleeing Ukraine where possible. Reports suggest that USD2,000 is enough for individuals to buy ‘off’ the register.

The importance of defence-industrial capabilities

As the war of attrition grinds on, a significant challenge for Moscow and Kyiv is to ensure that their forces are supplied with ample quantities of equipment and munitions. This makes economic and defence-industrial capabilities central to the prospects for both sides.

External support will remain crucial for Ukraine. Any reduction in financial or military aid, especially from large donors such as the United States or Germany, will increase pressure on its ability to conduct a strong defence. Although it would undoubtedly fight on if external support were to decline, this would require an enormous increase in domestic arms production capacity.

Russia, meanwhile, is likely to encounter problems in maintaining the large numbers of armoured vehicles and artillery currently deployed in Ukraine. It has already lost large volumes of equipment and has been forced to draw down on inventories of Soviet-era platforms. As these inventories are depleted, the need to produce large volumes of new equipment will rise, which may prove beyond the capabilities of Russia’s defence industry.