The two sides agreed a ceasefire to end days of border clashes, but various points of contention remain unresolved
On July 28, Thailand and Cambodia agreed a ceasefire to end days of fighting at their mutual border. The deal was reached during talks in Malaysia, this year’s ASEAN chair, that were also attended by Chinese and US officials. Despite the ceasefire, demarcating disputed border areas remains a thorny issue. Phnom Penh wants the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to settle the matter, but Bangkok rejects this.
What’s next
Bangkok and Phnom Penh will gradually restore normal diplomatic exchanges, helped by the several external players that are keen to see them ease tensions, but they will remain at odds over how to settle their differences over contested border areas. Hostilities could therefore resume within the next few months, especially given the heightened nationalist sentiment on both sides.
Subsidiary Impacts
- The US role in ensuring the ceasefire will help reaffirm Washington’s standing in South-east Asia.
- Beijing will highlight US tariffs in its continued efforts to portray itself as a more reliable partner for regional states than Washington.
- Confidence in ASEAN’s ability to help manage regional crises will grow.
Analysis
The border clashes that broke out on July 24 followed weeks of simmering tensions (see THAILAND/CAMBODIA: Border tensions will simmer – June 11, 2025).
The crisis began on May 28 with a brief exchange of gunfire between Thai and Cambodian troops in a disputed border area. One Cambodian soldier was killed.
Talks between the two governments and the two militaries helped prevent escalation. However, tit-for-tat border restrictions and other points of contention kept bilateral relations under strain.
Thailand said on July 23 that it was recalling its ambassador to Cambodia and expelling Cambodia’s ambassador to Thailand, following a landmine incident in which Thai soldiers were injured. Cambodia, denying that its forces had laid any new mines, responded by downgrading ties to their lowest level.
The July 24 fighting began with a gunfire exchange. As on May 28, each side blamed the other for initiating the hostilities.
The confrontation escalated. Thailand accused Cambodia of launching rockets across the border and conducted fighter-jet strikes on Cambodian territory. With its stronger military, it quickly gained the upper hand.
By the time the ceasefire was announced, dozens of Thai and Cambodian people — soldiers and civilians — had been killed, with many more injured and hundreds of thousands displaced.
External pressure
The path to the ceasefire underscored the importance of third-party intervention to mitigate bilateral friction.
On July 10, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke to his Thai and Cambodian counterparts — Maris Sangiampongsa and Prak Sokhonn, respectively — in separate meetings in Kuala Lumpur, on the sidelines of an ASEAN programme of events. He told both that China was willing to uphold an “impartial” stance and play a “constructive” role in easing the crisis.
Following the July 24 escalation, China expressed its deep concern and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim urged a ceasefire and dialogue. On July 25, during a meeting with ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn in Beijing, Wang expressed support for the regional group’s mediation efforts.
Cambodia — which had appealed to the UN Security Council to intervene — appeared open to mediation, but Thailand’s comments on the prospect were somewhat ambiguous. Its foreign ministry seemingly expressed both resistance to mediation and openness to mediation by Malaysia (as ASEAN chair).
Trump’s intervention was a turning point
On July 26, US President Donald Trump said he had spoken to Thai Acting Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai and Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet and that both parties were looking for an immediate ceasefire.
The trade-related leverage that he was able to exert was likely key in convincing Thailand (a treaty ally of the United States) that it had no choice but to accept mediation. Both Thailand and Cambodia face a 36% rate from tomorrow as part of Trump’s ‘reciprocal’ tariff scheme. Trump made it clear that he would only continue negotiations with the respective sides on lowering this once the fighting stopped.
Following the July 28 talks in Putrajaya, Anwar announced that Phumtham and Hun Manet had agreed to an “immediate and unconditional ceasefire”.
Commander-level talks took place on July 29 and further dialogue is scheduled to follow. However, each side has accused the other of violating the agreement.
Demarcation conundrum
In addition to only having a fragile ceasefire, the two sides remain far from resolving their fundamental territorial disagreement.
On June 15, Cambodia asked the ICJ to rule on the demarcation of four border areas, even though Thailand rejects invoving the court in the matter. Bangkok says the demarcation should be resolved bilaterally through mechanisms such as the Joint Boundary Commission.
Thailand’s wariness is to a large extent based on past ICJ rulings regarding the border. In 2013, the court reaffirmed its 1962 judgement (delivered on June 15 that year) that Cambodia had sovereignty over the land around the Preah Vihear Temple. This followed a series of deadly border clashes over land surrounding centuries-old temple complexes between 2008 and 2011.
Mutual antipathy
The demarcation issue and general ill feeling between the countries — worsened by the recent fighting — means that a return to hostilities in the near future cannot be ruled out.
Given the disparities between their militaries and economies, Thailand can hurt Cambodia far more than Cambodia can hurt Thailand. Nevertheless, a full-blown conflict would be severely detrimental to both sides. Thai Finance Minister Pichai Chunhavajira indicated on July 29 that the five-day confrontation had inflicted economic damage amounting to more than USD300mn on Thailand.
Containing anti-Cambodian sentiment in Thailand and anti-Thai sentiment in Cambodia will be a tough challenge, especially as politicians on both sides continue to stoke nationalist fervour.
A full-blown conflict would hurt both countries
Since May, Thailand has experienced considerable domestic fallout from the crisis. The country has an acting prime minister because its Constitutional Court suspended Paetongtarn Shinawatra from the post on July 1, after taking up a petition filed against her by senators who want her removed from office. They accuse her of ethical violations in a June 15 phone call with former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen (audio of which was leaked), in which she criticised Thailand’s military (see THAILAND: Premier will struggle to hold onto her post – June 27, 2025).
Cambodia may have hoped that political instability in Thailand would divert attention towards the prospect of a military coup there. In any case, Hun Sen — who is Hun Manet’s father — has demonstrated that he continues to dominate Cambodian politics (see CAMBODIA: Row will strengthen Hun Sen’s position – July 3, 2025).
One key way in which Thailand will maintain pressure on Cambodia is by intensifying its efforts to link the Cambodian government to regional scam centres. Areas in Cambodia near the Thailand-Cambodia border are a key hotspot for the problem. The compounds typically rely on labour sourced through human trafficking, including from China.
During the recent confrontation, Thailand appeared to target some of these compounds.
China will continue to profess its impartiality amid the wider crisis, wary of alienating either side, but a degree of friction between Bangkok and Phnom Penh may suit it, if this supports its efforts to dismantle the scam networks.
Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim (centre), flanked by Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet (left) and Thai Acting Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai (right), speaking at a press conference following the ceasefire talks in Putrajaya on July 28 (Mohd Rasfan/Pool/AFP/Getty Images)
Analyst
Dr Joydeep Sen
