Prospects for Middle East security in 2025

The central scenario is for low-level and targeted fighting in Gaza coupled with efforts to sustain Lebanon’s ceasefire

Nearly 14 months after Hamas’s attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023, prospects for conflict in the Middle East in 2025 will be shaped by the continued fighting in Gaza and a fragile truce in Lebanon. Although regional actors may shift approaches during the second year of this conflict, the trajectory is not towards conflict resolution but rather towards conflict management.

It remains an open question whether Trump will live up to his campaign pledge of “ending all wars”, and therefore apply pressure on Netanyahu to opt for a ceasefire/hostage release deal in Gaza and to sustain the ceasefire in Lebanon.

Gaza

With Netanyahu’s continued pursuit of “total victory” against Hamas, there are currently no clear plans for ending the war in Gaza or for the ‘day after’.

In Lebanon, Netanyahu faced little domestic political risk to agreeing to a ceasefire. Israel’s aims there were more limited, and a ceasefire did not threaten his government’s stability.

In contrast, Netanyahu’s far-right coalition partners remain firmly opposed to any compromises in Gaza. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir do not want the war to end, and oppose a Hamas prisoner release in return for hostages or a ceasefire that would involve a withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. Ben-Gvir has threatened to collapse the government in the event of a ceasefire (see ISRAEL/PALESTINIANS: There is no end in sight to war – October 7, 2024 and see ISRAEL: Strategic and personal factors drive premier – October 21, 2024).

Moreover, there are suggestions that both ministers hope to create the conditions for reoccupying and resettling Gaza. Given the extent of international opposition to that and the security situation in Gaza, this may be unrealistic. Nonetheless, Netanyahu has been ambiguous on the matter, and the Trump administration’s position will be critical.

In the absence of a clear Israeli plan for the ‘day after’ the war, the fighting is likely to continue in a more targeted manner, mostly in southern and central areas. In northern Gaza, Israeli forces will likely lay the foundations for an indefinite period of continued presence. The intention is for northern Gaza to serve as a buffer zone and a launching pad to allow for quicker operational access into other areas.

Meanwhile, ordinary Gazans will continue to live through a humanitarian catastrophe, experiencing food and water scarcity, disease and displacement. A source close to Trump has said that, in a change from the Biden administration’s policy, the incoming administration will not condition US weapon supplies to Israel on its government allowing more humanitarian aid into Gaza (see ISRAEL: Government aims to phase out UNRWA activities – October 29, 2024 and see ISRAEL: More scrutiny may not alter Gaza strategy – October 18, 2024 and see PALESTINIANS: Gaza will receive very limited relief – August 30, 2024).

Nonetheless, US pressure could change Israel’s calculations. With a ceasefire in place in Lebanon, the current US administration has suggested a renewed effort to reach a truce in Gaza. Netanyahu has also acknowledged that conditions have changed in Gaza, with Hamas isolated and its leadership dead.

Failing a ceasefire before end-2024, the degree to which the incoming administration will focus on Gaza will depend on US foreign policy priorities and Trump’s national security team. Trump does appear to want to be the president who, during his first few months in office, ends or de-escalates the war in Gaza and brings about a ceasefire/hostage release deal. He may also want to show Muslim and Arab voters that he is attentive to their concerns.

Lebanon

Israel’s campaign of aerial strikes and ground operations have succeeded in degrading Hezbollah’s capabilities (see ISRAEL: Army will push Hezbollah even harder – September 19, 2024 and see ISRAEL: Forces may intensify Hezbollah attacks – October 3, 2024).

However, even while suffering setbacks, Hezbollah managed to launch missiles, rockets and drones into Israeli territory in the north and centre, including the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, resulting in casualties and destruction. Hezbollah’s rocket and drone attacks have also led to a growing sense of insecurity and vulnerability among Israelis.

Throughout, Israel’s senior command has remained cognisant that destroying Hezbollah as a military and political entity is highly unlikely. That helped set the stage for the ceasefire that went into effect on November 27.

The durability of the ceasefire will depend on how effectively it can be enforced (see LEBANON: Durability of truce hinges on enforcement – November 27, 2024). Another issue is whether the parties will make miscalculations or take provocative steps that would lead to further conflagration. Nevertheless, Hezbollah, with Iran’s backing, may be likely to adhere to the ceasefire; the group wants to rebuild and reconsolidate after the major setbacks it suffered in recent months.

Meanwhile, the return of Israeli residents to the north will take time. They are already sceptical of the agreement and have expressed reluctance to do so.

The wider region

In the aftermath of two direct Israel-Iran confrontations in April and October, there is uncertainty regarding the trajectory of Israeli-Iranian dynamics in 2025. Those will depend on strategic and political considerations among leaders on both sides, as well as the policies of the incoming Trump administration.

Iran’s leaders are searching for strategic direction to address setbacks, calling into question its national security strategy and its ideology-based campaign to pressure Israel. Israel’s air and ground campaigns have significantly degraded the military and political capabilities and influence of Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ allies, particularly Hamas and Hezbollah.

Compounding Tehran’s difficulties is the likely return to a policy of ‘maximum pressure’ under Trump; certainly, Iranian leaders appear to be taking Trump and his aides at their word. Additional US pressure will not aim to try to change Iran’s governing structure. Instead, Trump likely seeks a revised agreement with Iran to constrain its nuclear programme and cripple its efforts to support regional armed non-state actors.

For its part, Israel has demonstrated its ability to strike strategic targets inside Iran and has vowed to continue, if Iran retaliates for Israel’s most recent attack in Iran on October 26 (see MIDDLE EAST: Iran-Israel war remains a possibility – October 14, 2024 and see ISRAEL: Strikes will constrain Iran’s capacity to act – October 28, 2024).Widening the conflict to include Iran has not been and is not one of Israel’s stated war objectives post-October 7, 2023. Israel’s preference is to coordinate next steps vis-a-vis Iran with the incoming administration, hoping Trump will opt for a tougher approach against Iran, including the possible use of military actions. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia will likely act as a countervailing force to Israeli intentions against Iran.

Saudi Arabia will seek to moderate US policies towards Iran. With its detente with Tehran on track and a focus on stability and economic diversification, Riyadh has less interest in seeing actions that could trigger a regionwide conflagration. Gulf officials are therefore likely to position themselves to mediate between Tehran and Washington (see GULF STATES: Leaders will moderate Trump’s policies – November 18, 2024).