Lebanon’s Hezbollah will sit out the Iran-Israel war

Domestic considerations drive the Shia political-military movement’s caution about assisting longstanding backer Tehran

On June 13, political-military Shia movement Hezbollah said it would not retaliate against Israel’s airstrikes on Iran. Hezbollah’s decision reflects a strategy of self-preservation, following its devastating war with Israel in 2024. It also aligns with Iran’s decision so far not to activate its proxy networks or expand attacks to other regional countries, which would risk triggering a wider conflagration and undercutting support for Tehran among Arab and Muslim states.

Diplomatic intervention from the United States and France, as well as Hezbollah’s compliance with LAF demands, guaranteed Lebanon’s non-engagement in the war. This picture of diplomatic coordination squares with positive reports from a June 11 meeting between head of Hezbollah’s parliamentary bloc Mohammed Raad and French special envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian.

Hezbollah holds back

The 2024 Israel-Hezbollah confrontation showed how deeply Israel had infiltrated the group. Israeli forces successfully eliminated its leadership and decimated its military capacity (see ISRAEL/LEBANON: A fragile truce will set in – December 6, 2024).

Despite a ceasefire in place since November 2024, Israeli drones continue to target Hezbollah. As recently as June 5, Israel attacked an alleged drone production facility in the southern suburbs of Beirut, even after the LAF had inspected the site (see LEBANON: Hezbollah may struggle with a new phase – March 24, 2025).

Nonetheless, the ceasefire has probably given Hezbollah respite to regroup and rearm, albeit in a limited area north of the Litani river. South of the river, Israel claims to have destroyed 90% of Hezbollah’s infrastructure. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam said on June 4 that the LAF has dismantled more than 500 military positions and arms depots in the area.

An attack on Israel now would be met with demands rather than requests from the LAF to inspect sites north of the Litani, extending into the southern suburbs of Beirut. That could be the first step towards full disarmament, something Hezbollah wants to avoid. In response to Israeli complaints, the international monitoring committee charged with implementing the ceasefire has in recent months pushed such requests (see LEBANON: Hezbollah faces unrelenting push to disarm – April 9, 2025).

Although the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) diminished Hezbollah’s rockets stockpile in the war, the group may still have the capability to land a series of blows to northern Israel. However, the price for that is likely too heavy for its new leadership. The group’s long-term goal of remaining an armed force within Lebanon would be compromised if it invited massive aerial attacks now.

A diminished entity

Hezbollah’s defeat in the war with Israel and the killing of its charismatic leader Hassan Nasrallah have transformed it. The IDF estimates that it more than halved Hezbollah’s military capacity:

• Around 70% of its firepower at various ranges was destroyed, as was much of the tunnel network in south Lebanon.
• About 4,500 military personnel were killed and a further 9,000 wounded (nearly half of its regular fighting force).
• Its progress in rebuilding militarily will be slow, as it is no longer able to import Iranian weapons via Syria or Beirut airport, due to stringent border security measures.

With the loss of deterrence, Hezbollah now faces strong and rising calls inside Lebanon to disarm and become a regular political party.

Hezbollah has also suffered damage to its financial system, including al-Qard al-Hasan Association — the Hezbollah-linked financial institution that provides aid to its Shia constituency (see LEBANON: Risk of civil and sectarian unrest will rise – October 22, 2024). This has made it difficult to support the recovery from the war.

The UN estimates that 92,000 civilians are still unable to return to their homes after the conflict. For them and many others, economic recovery and reconstruction will take precedence over ideology.

With limited popular appetite for war in the Shia community, and hardly any outside it, war now would mean a major political setback for Hezbollah. In his initial response on June 13, Secretary-General Naim Qassem condemned the attacks on Iran but stopped short of promising military support.

He and the party’s leadership view the current period as one when Lebanese concerns supersede regional ones. From a historical perspective, the movement has been through other such periods, while remaining ideologically committed to the long-term goal of resistance.

Scenarios for war

It would probably take an existential threat to Iran and its theocratic Shia system, with which Hezbollah is deeply ideologically aligned, for the group to enter the conflict.

If, for instance, the United States were to take part and successfully destroy Iran’s Fordow nuclear facility, the loss of that last deterrent could trigger a desperate call from Tehran for Hezbollah to attack Israel with its remaining rockets. Hezbollah may still possess several types of long-range rockets that it did not use in the 2024 fighting.

US involvement could also trigger irregular warfare against US — and possibly French and UK — interests, in the region and beyond. Hezbollah is unlikely to join such attacks unless the war appears to threaten the Iranian government’s survival. Even in that case, the group might decide to shore up its Lebanese position rather than sacrificing itself for a moribund regime.

Meanwhile, internal criticism of Qassem’s policy towards Tehran could create divisions within Hezbollah. So far, calls for a return to a more hardline confrontational approach, although they exist in the movement, have been kept contained and do not appear to have wide currency, given the clear dangers. However, this could change as tensions mount.