Georgian government will resist making concessions

The ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party is largely responsible for the current crisis. Allegations of fraud during the October parliamentary elections, alongside the adoption of a controversial ‘foreign agent’ law modelled on Russian legislation earlier in the year, had already eroded trust in the government (see GEORGIA: Foreign policy will shift towards Eurasia – June 13, 2024 and see GEORGIA: Polls will be critical to country’s future – October 25, 2024).

These actions led to the EU effectively pausing Georgia’s accession process earlier this year.However, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze’s announcement on November 28 that accession discussions would be halted until 2028 marked a tipping point (see GEORGIA: EU accession plans will be shelved – November 29, 2024).

With approximately 80% of Georgians favouring EU membership, the decision sparked nationwide protests, with demonstrations extending beyond the capital, Tbilisi, to cities such as Poti, Batumi, Kutaisi, Zugdidi, Rustavi and others (see GEORGIA: Protests are likely to continue – December 2, 2024).

The government’s motives for making the decision are unclear, although earlier the same day the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for the October election results not to be recognised, urging a re-run within a year under international observation, and also proposing sanctions against GD leaders. This appears to have prompted the government to adopt a proactive approach to demonstrate its political strength, citing the need to maintain the country’s “sovereignty”.

Political standoffs and escalation

A political rift between the prime minister and President Salome Zourabichvili further compounded the crisis. Although the presidency has had limited powers since GD ended direct elections for the role, Zourabichvili has used her platform to challenge the legitimacy of the parliament. She has refused to step down at the end of her term in December unless new elections are held, highlighting the extent of political polarisation.

Since the announcement on November 28, confrontations between protesters and riot police have intensified. The authorities resorted to using water cannons, with widespread reports of abductions, beatings and arrests of opposition leaders.

In response, hundreds of public servants from ministries — including foreign affairs, defence and education — alongside judges, journalists and business representatives, issued joint statements condemning GD’s decision.

Although the demonstrations are widespread and broad-based, the political opposition remains fractured beyond its hostility to GD. The lack of an overarching leadership could make it easier for the government to ignore the protesters’ demands.

International implications

What happens next in Georgia will have important implications for larger countries with an interest in the South Caucasus (see PROSPECTS 2025: South Caucasus foreign policy – November 11, 2024).

The Western response

The EU and the United States have a strong interest in supporting Georgia’s democratic aspirations while avoiding actions that could exacerbate instability or push Tbilisi closer to Russia. As a result, policy-makers have so far sought to craft a carefully calibrated response. The Western policy response is likely to focus on:

• Condemning violence: Western governments will denounce the use of excessive force against peaceful protesters.
• Targeted sanctions: measures against officials implicated in violence and repression could pressure the GD government while avoiding undue harm to the general population. Punitive actions, such as a blanket suspension of visa-free travel, could alienate ordinary Georgians and weaken pro-European sentiments.

Western policy-makers also face a dilemma regarding Bidzina Ivanishvili, GD’s billionaire founder, who maintains considerable political influence. Sanctions against him and his associates risk alienating the Georgian government but may also serve as leverage to steer the country back toward European integration.

The view from Moscow

For Russia, it is important that GD remains in power. Although the extent of the government’s sympathies towards Moscow is likely exaggerated, it has presided over a thawing of relations between the two countries that fought a short war in 2008. Bilateral trade has soared as Georgia has emerged as an important source of sanctioned Western goods (see GEORGIA: Relations with Abkhazia will improve – November 20, 2024). Tbilisi has also adopted a more ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy, altering its previous pro-Western course.

During its election campaign, GD suggested that a vote for the opposition could invite Russian intervention and plunge the country into chaos. However, Russian forces are occupied in Ukraine, the Middle East and North Africa. Any significant military intervention would mean stretching Moscow’s already thinly spread military. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that Russia would choose military intervention.

Scenarios

At this stage, three potential scenarios appear most likely. For now, the third scenario — ‘attrition’ — is marginally the most likely. However, the probability of one scenario becoming more likely than the others is contingent on events. For example, a particularly egregious instance of government brutality could elicit even more popular resistance.

Scenario one: limited government concessions

The ruling GD party could de-escalate tensions by reversing its decision and reaffirming a commitment to EU integration. Such a course of action would likely require the resignation of Kobakhidze, whose unwavering loyalty to Ivanishvili makes him a key figure in the crisis. Although this approach might restore some public trust, it would damage GD’s credibility and political standing.

Scenario two: increased repression

The government could increase the use of repressive measures against the protesters. However, an intensified crackdown — marked by arrests and increasing force — would risk Georgia’s further isolation from Western states. International sanctions and visa bans targeting GD leaders and law enforcement officials would likely follow. Over time, such isolation might push Georgia to deepen ties with Russia, China, Iran, Turkey and other Eurasian powers, altering the country’s geopolitical orientation.

Relying on force has already eroded GD’s public support. The more the government employs repressive tactics, the more momentum the protesters and opposition leaders will likely gain. Demands for fresh elections are likely to grow even louder, which might be the only way to restore political stability.

Scenario three: attrition

The government may recognise the dangers of increasing its use of repressive tactics and instead opt to wear down the will of the protesters by policing protests, using targeted but small-scale arrests, and ignoring the demands of the opposition.

The absence of clear leadership among the protesters could support this approach, enabling the government to remain in power without making any meaningful concessions. Over time — and in the absence of any further events that could trigger further popular dissatisfaction — this could test the endurance of protesters and leave the country in a state of fragile peace.