Egypt aims to undercut Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa

Over the past year, Egypt has boosted security links with Somalia, and is also closely coordinating with Eritrea

The presidents of Egypt, Eritrea and Somalia yesterday met in Eritrea. This comes amid rising tensions in the Horn of Africa ever since Somaliland and Ethiopia signed an agreement in January giving the latter land to build a naval facility in return for recognition of the former’s independence. This has angered Somalia, which considers Somaliland part of its territory. Egypt has supported Somalia by supplying arms and expressing readiness to deploy troops.

In August, Egypt announced it was ready to deploy troops as part of a new AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia (see SOMALIA: Egypt offer may politicise peacekeeping plans – August 8, 2024). The mandate of the current AU mission expires at the end of 2024, and it will be replaced by a new force, the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) (see SOMALIA: New AU mission may face old challenges – August 5, 2024).

That same month, Egypt and Somalia signed a defence pact, which Somalia said would bolster security cooperation and serve as a “blueprint for the exchange of knowledge and expertise”. Subsequently, media outlets reported widely on the delivery of Egyptian military equipment (weapons and ammunition) to Somalia in August and September. Cairo has also maintained strong rhetoric, including directly from President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, in support of Mogadishu and its territorial integrity.

With these actions, Cairo has inserted itself forcefully into the Horn of Africa’s disputes. Somali-Ethiopian relations have deteriorated markedly because of Ethiopia’s overtures toward the breakaway Somaliland state, despite Ethiopia’s longstanding role as a security guarantor in Somalia (see ETHIOPIA/SOMALIA: Tension may fuel wider instability – September 12, 2024).

Somaliland, in northern Somalia, declared its independence in 1991 but has never received recognition of its independence from any state. Somalia views Somaliland independence as a threat to its territorial integrity and national unity. Mogadishu has said it will not accept Ethiopian troop participation in AUSSOM, unless Addis Ababa withdraws from its agreement with Somaliland.

Ethiopia’s moves are largely motivated by a desire to gain access through Somaliland to its deep-water port of Berbera. As a landlocked country, Ethiopia currently relies on sea access on its neighbouring Djibouti, and it likely does not want to remain reliant only on one port. Moreover, Addis Ababa seeks a naval base to help project influence in the Red Sea.

It begins and ends with Ethiopia

Egypt’s increasingly assertive regional role and growing defence ties with Somalia is an extension of its own worsening ties with Ethiopia.

Water security

Egypt is opposed to Ethiopia’s construction and operation of the GERD on the Nile River, which it views as a threat to its water security (see ETHIOPIA/EGYPT: Dam dispute requires tough compromise – September 14, 2023 and see see EGYPT: Water insecurity will challenge the government – July 30, 2024).

For Ethiopia, GERD (which it started constructing in 2011) on the Blue Nile is essential for meeting the country’s development needs — specifically, to deliver electricity to an impoverished population. Major construction work is complete, and it is close to being fully operational.

Egypt typically relies on water inflows from the Nile River; the 1959 Nile Treaty sets Egypt’s water quota at 55.5 billion cubic metres per year (bcm/y). Given lower demand from Sudan, Egypt has historically used more water than allocated by the treaty, at approximately 60 bcm/y. Egypt has objected repeatedly to the GERD’s possible impact on the country’s water availability. Although hydrologists have generally assessed that those fears are exaggerated, that could change if Ethiopia continues to expand its use of the Nile waters, for other purposes such as irrigation.

Mediation efforts and negotiations have failed to resolve the issue. Recently, Cairo sent a letter to the UN Security Council accusing Ethiopia of violating international law by continuing to fill the dam. The letter further stresses readiness to take “all necessary measures” to defend its “existence”.

With tensions high over GERD, Egypt saw an opportunity to exploit Somalia’s dispute to push back against Ethiopia.

Red Sea zone of influence

The trilateral summit in Eritrea yesterday ended with an agreement on cooperating over security in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

This is clearly intended to offset Ethiopia’s ambitions to build a strong navy and project naval power into the Red Sea. Cairo would see that as encroaching on its own sphere of influence, and it will enhance security cooperation with like-minded states in the region to prevent that.

AU deployment

The prospect of an Egyptian deployment of peacekeepers to Somalia marks a major level of commitment, which could give Cairo a military presence along Ethiopia’s borders. However, there will be significant risks associated with that:

• This would raise the risks of possible clashes with Ethiopian troops, even if minor, especially if tensions rise further.
• Somalia remains a highly unstable country with a powerful jihadist group in the form of al-Shabaab, as well as a growing Islamic State affiliate. Depending on where Egyptian forces are deployed, they will be at high risk of being attacked.

Moreover, the deployment raises the possibility of widening the policy differences between Egypt and its main financial backer, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) over Africa. Abu Dhabi’s support for Addis Ababa is strong, and the UAE is a major investor in the Berbera port.

So far, however, such tensions have not emerged. Cairo and Abu Dhabi appear content with maintaining different positions in such places as Sudan, the Horn of Africa and Yemen, without those impacting their bilateral relations. UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan is a frequent visitor to Egypt.

Outlook

Egypt’s military deployment in Somalia demonstrates a more assertive approach to foreign policy issues, especially where it sees its interests directly threatened. Depending ultimately on the final shape of Egypt’s troop deployment, Cairo might use those troops to try and project force credibly, and follow through on threats of military action in case of future major flashpoints.

That approach is likely to resonate positively domestically. The decision to deploy forces as part of the AU was generally met with approval in Cairo. For over a decade, the feeling among Egyptians was that the government has not handled the GERD issue effectively, and in reaction to recent moves, the mood has been supportive.

However, in the short term, Egypt’s actions are unlikely to encourage a return to negotiations. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is strongly averse to pressure and has shown a readiness to meet confrontation with hostility. However, over time, the heat could go out of the situation, and Egypt’s troop presence could eventually become a possible point of leverage.