Russian demographics

There are perhaps few more pressing long-term challenges facing the authorities in Moscow than Russia’s demographic decline.  While the precise causes and remedies are subject to debate, Russia’s demographic picture becomes particularly intriguing when parsed out by region and ethnicity.  Official statistics reveal that birth rates in particular are widely variable among Russia’s ethnic groups:

• For self-identified ethnic Russians over the age of 35, the average number of children per woman is just over 1.8. 
• Ukrainian and Belarusian fertility rates are slightly higher, but still well below the replacement rate of 2.1
• However, the ratio for women over 35 in Ingushetia averages out to nearly 4.1, and by some accounts, Dagestani women have an even higher number of children on average. 
• Indeed, four out of five of the most prolific populations in Russia inhabit the restive -- and predominantly Muslim – republics of the North Caucasus (the only non-Muslim community among these ranks is the Turkic population of Tyva, who generally ascribe to Tibetan Buddhism).

Nonetheless, even by optimistic estimates, Russia’s population is expected to shrink to 120 million people by 2050, and perhaps fall as low as 100 million.  Slavic ethnicities account for nearly 84% of Russia’s population; though Russia on the whole is remarkably ethnically diverse, population growth in minority communities cannot make up for severe contractions among the preponderant majority. 

Former President Vladimir Putin’s push for pro-natalist social policies implies that increasing Russians’ birth rates is a key domestic priority.  While maternity programmes are still well below levels offered in Western Europe, a basic framework is in place to improve families’ quality of life and provide financial incentives for families to bear more children.

Russia: Population structure and dependency ratios (thousands)
	1989	2002	2006	2007
	(census)	(census)	(as of 1st Jan)	(as of 1st Jan)
* Men aged 16-59 and women 16-54
** The number of dependants (those above and below the working age) per 1,000 workers
Source: 'Demographic Policy in Russia: From Reflection to Action', UN in Russian Federation, 2008
Below working age	35,995	26,327	23,317	22,718
Working age*	83,746	88,942	90,328	90,152
Above working age	27,196	29,778	29,109	29,351
Dependency ratio**	755	631	580	578

Compensation for pre-school education, for example, rises from 20% of the cost for a first child, to 50% for a second, to 70% for any additional children.  Yet the measures also contain some unusual provisions, such as excluding mothers over 30 years of age from receiving housing benefits.  This seems particularly unproductive in light of the fact that the average age at which women first give birth in Russia has been increasing steadily since the fall of the Soviet Union.   

Although there is much doom-saying among officials and observers about the perils of a population decline in Russia, it is not a foregone conclusion that a smaller population will inevitably lead to a reduction in economic growth or a loss of geopolitical power.  Russia’s population density per kilometre is actually higher than in Australia or Canada, neither of which seem to have suffered adverse political or economic effects by virtue of their low (or regionally uneven) population densities. 

Therefore, Russia’s undeniable demographic challenges are perhaps better defined as public health dilemmas.  The rapid decline in life expectancy in Russia since the 1960s -- particularly Russian male life expectancy, now a dismal 58 years on average -- has been widely noted.  Once again, regional variations provide insight into the scope and nature of the challenges Moscow faces: despite the post-conflict political and social context of the North Caucasus, men there actually have the highest life expectancy in Russia.

According to a recent UNICEF report, in Russia, “[…] the greatest preventable mortality is from causes related to alcoholism”.  While residents of the North Caucasus might not always strictly adhere to the precepts of Islam, it seems likely that prevailing norms against drinking alcohol (or drinking to excess, if interpreted more liberally) have had a positive influence on health and demography in the region.  Relatively low levels of industrial pollution should also be credited with raising North Caucasians’ life expectancies.  

If addressing these two preventable factors can boost the longevity of a war-torn population, one wonders at the impact they might have if applied to the whole of Russia.  Changing social attitudes to alcohol consumption and addressing a multitude of environmental crises may not be high on Russian leaders’ priority lists.  The lessons of some of Russia’s regions is that they ought to be.