EU: Soviet shadows

EU foreign ministers face the double challenge of securing internal consensus and maintaining external credibility when they discuss Belarus and Uzbekistan sanctions on Monday.

All EU members agree that both countries show a lack of respect for democratic norms and imposed sanctions, but they have had little impact. Both remain politically and economically close to their former ‘imperial’ master Russia, which is less demanding than Western standards. While the EU is keen to promote democratisation, both Belarus and Uzbekistan have become strategically so important that some EU members have warned that the political price for insisting on norms and values might be too high:

• With the EU enlargement of 2004, Belarus became a direct neighbour of the bloc. Having a stable and pro-European Belarus is thus becoming increasingly important.

• Uzbekistan hosts a German military airbase, which supplies the US-led anti-terror mission in Afghanistan, and is also considered to hold enormous oil and gas reserves, which on day could help the EU reduce its dependence on Russian energy.

This growing strategic importance, coupled with Russia’s increasing activity in its neighbourhood, has led to a cautious rapprochement, including plans for regional co-operation and the relaxation of travel bans on governments.

This softer EU approach was not entirely ineffective. Tashkent released some political prisoners, abolished the death penalty and entered into a human rights dialogue with the EU, while Minsk also freed its political prisoners and allowed limited opposition protests.  However, it was the Russian invasion of Georgia in August that suddenly boosted the EU’s willingness (or desperation) to cooperate with these authoritarian regimes:

• At the first EU-Central Asia forum held in September, the EU elevated energy cooperation to its “top political priority”, while merely paying lip service “common objectives of respect for democracy, human rights and rule of law”.  In fact, the human right situation in Uzbekistan has recently worsened, with authorities resuming arrests of political opponents.

• Similarly, the EU in September offered the prospects of a high-level meeting with Belarus officials, if the September 28 election was held in a satisfactory manner.  Despite a Western consensus that the election fell short of any democratic standards, despite renewed arrests of opposition politicians and despite new media restrictions imposed in June, the EU nevertheless temporarily suspended the travel ban and invited the Belarusian foreign minister to its meeting on Monday.

EU officials are quick to justify their lowered standards by pointing to the fact that neither Minsk nor Tashkent have bowed to Russian pressure and officially recognised the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  This fact alone, some claim, would justify a relaxation of the sanctions. Given the renewed fear of Russian assertiveness in its neighbourhood and increased desire for reducing dependency on Russian energy, those states that traditionally insisted on human rights and democracy in Uzbekistan (especially post-communist and Scandinavian members) may now favour a more pragmatic approach. 

The only country currently voicing concern over the EU’s willingness to ignore its values is the Netherlands. While the Netherlands was happy to apply its veto for those reasons over unfreezing the Stability and Association Agreement with Serbia, it may not go as far on Monday when it comes to Belarus and Uzbekistan.  As long as its policy towards former Soviet republics is driven by fear of Moscow, the EU will find it difficult to put norms above strategic interests and risks losing its credibility as a promoter of democracy and human rights.