Russia redraws the map

Some aspects of Russia and Georgia’s short but bloody conflict remain obscured by the fog of war -- the extent of casualties, for instance, and the damage to military and civilian infrastructure.  Nor has much light been cast on reports of continued violence, which threaten to undermine the EU-brokered ceasefire proposal.

One thing is clear, however: the status of Georgia’s separatist regions has been fundamentally altered by Russia’s overwhelming military victory.  As the EU’s shuttle diplomacy continues over the coming weeks, Russia could opt for one of three scenarios for the separatist regions that it now occupies:

Annexation 

According to Tbilisi, this has been Russia’s goal all along.  The majority of Abkhazian and South Ossetian residents hold Russian passports, both regions’ economies are based on the rouble, and since April, Moscow has sought to ‘strengthen political and diplomatic ties’ with the secessionist statelets.  Annexation would be particularly attractive to the population and leadership of the Russian republic of North Ossetia, which shares a culture, language and ethnic identity with South Ossetia.  According to a reliable August 9-10 public opinion poll, nearly half of Russians would favour incorporating South Ossetia into Russia proper (about a third support South Ossetian independence, and a mere 4% believe it should remain in Georgia). 

However, if they were incorporated into Russia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia would be among its most socio-economically challenged regions.  Even before Georgia pummelled the South Ossetian capital with Katyusha rockets, basic infrastructure in the regions was inadequate at best. 

More importantly, annexing the regions also carries serious risks to Russia’s reputation on the international stage.  A literal redrawing of the Russian-Georgian border would provoke severe condemnation, particularly from the United States and EU.  Moscow has amply demonstrated that it cares little about winning popularity contests in the West, but it does not want to be regarded as too much of a threat.  Annexing South Ossetia and Abkhazia would reinforce the fears and amplify the rhetoric of those in the West who view Russia’s recent behaviour as a throwback to 19th century realpolitik.

Recognition 

Short of annexation, Russia could recognise the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.  Both ‘republics’ interpreted Kosovo’s declaration of independence as precedent for their own aspirations of sovereignty.  Sukhumi and Tskhinvali have already asked Moscow to recognise their independence.  Indeed, they can point to the example of Nagorno-Karabakh.  The region is officially part of Azerbaijan, but has declared itself independent, and maintains exceptionally strong political, military and economic ties with the Armenian government -- which, not coincidentally, is a close ally of Russia.

However, the costs of recognising Abkhazia or South Ossetia probably outweigh the benefits.  Russia has consistently opposed the West’s handling of Kosovo, and would be vulnerable to charges of blatant hypocrisy should it recognise Georgia’s secessionist regions.  Moscow is already concerned about the implications of the ‘Kosovo precedent’ for the restive North Caucasus republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan.  Furthermore, since it is highly unlikely that Russia could cobble together a coalition of countries that would follow its lead in recognising Abkhazia or South Ossetia, Moscow would risk further international isolation should it make this move.

Military protectorates

Perhaps the most likely option is the one that brings the situation close to the pre-war status quo.  South Ossetia and Abkhazia could formally remain within Georgia’s borders, but under the protection of a heavily reinforced Russian peacekeeping presence.  Though Moscow could accept an international civilian humanitarian mission there, it will almost certainly refuse a multinational military peacekeeping force, arguing that Georgia’s military adventurism in South Ossetia proves that Russian forces are the only adequate guarantors of regional security. 

This option carries the danger -- especially for President Dmitry Medvedev, who has struggled to assert his authority throughout the crisis -- of appearing weak in the eyes of the Russian public.  Kremlin political technologists will undoubtedly spin any settlement as a great victory for Moscow.  Yet Russia’s domestic audience, not to mention nationalistically inclined members of the ruling elite, could criticise the government for failing to take advantage of Moscow’s robust military and diplomatic advantage following Georgia’s defeat.

If the West wants to keep Abkhazia and South Ossetia within Georgia’s borders, it must seek to understand what is at stake for Russia, and particularly for Russia’s president.  Allowing the Kremlin to take the initiative in resolving the conflict would not necessarily result in a crude ‘land-grab’, though it might risk legitimising Moscow’s overwhelming military response to Georgia’s strategic folly.  The first of (undoubtedly) many rounds of settlement talks will likely begin this week.  Russia dominates the negotiating table, but the exact outcome of the conflict is still far from settled.