Al-Qaida's 'moral compass'

Is al-Qaida on the road to Damascus? The terrorist group, which uses religious reasoning to justify the use of force against the West, is getting familiar with moral relativism. The recent defection of the man who laid the intellectual foundations for al-Qaida's murderous acts, Sayyid Imam al-Sherif -- a 58-year old Egyptian better known by his nom de guerre, Dr. Fadl -- has left the group's members questioning the use of violence to achieve their aims.

In the latest edition of The New Yorker, Pulitzer Prize-winning author Lawrence Wright tells the story of a fax he received in May 2007 from Fadl, who is serving time in Tora Prison, Egypt. Fadl wanted to draw Wright's attention to his new book, a rejection of al-Qaida's violence. Fadl's fax confirmed rumors that imprisoned leaders of al-Jihad, an Egyptian Islamist group active since the late 1970s, were also lining up to renounce violence.

Dr. Death's palimpsest

It is unlikely that al-Qaida will follow the example of al-Jihad, and revise its violent strategy. Yet the defection of Fadl, the man who devoted himself to formalising the rules of a just holy war, represents a substantial moral challenge to radical Islam.

Fadl wrote 'The Essential Guide for Preparation' in 1988, as the Afghan jihad wound down. It became one of the most important texts in the training of mujahideen, asserting that Muslims must always be in conflict with nonbelievers, and promising divine rewards for martyrs.

In 1994, jihadi justifications became more vehement.  Fadl penned 'The Compendium of the Pursuit of Divine Knowledge', which declared that the infidel's "rule, his prayers, and the prayers of those who pray behind him" were invalid.  The 'Compendium' essentially gave al-Qaida, and all those who invoked its name, carte blanche to murder all who stood in their way.

Thirteen years later, and an apparent change of heart. 'Rationalising Jihad in Egypt and the World,' which first appeared in November 2007, on the tenth anniversary of the Luxor massacre, made sweeping changes to Fadl's well-known views. Fadl established a new set of rules of engagement for jihad, which defined most forms of terrorism as illegal under Islamic law. Most interestingly, Fadl believed that the hijackers of 9/11 'betrayed' the enemy because they had been given US visas, a contract of protection. He threatened that on Judgment Day, every double-crosser would be sodomised with a banner proportionate to his treachery.

Whatever the motivations behind the writing of the book, government coercion, epiphany or gradual intellectual drift, imprisoned al-Jihad members appended their signatures to Fadl's manuscript, hoping, no doubt, for an early release.

Discrediting Fadl

The fact that the prisoners were, and are, re-examining the legitimacy of violence is worrying for al-Qaida's stewards, who know violence is the fast balm that binds radical Islamist organisations. Osama Bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, have always presented their war against the United States and its allies as justified, necessary and limited, explaining their casus belli in terms of resisting unprovoked aggression.

Zawahiri needed to depict Fadl as a cracked moral compass, without compromising the authority of his own organisation. He finally did so in a 200-page refutation which appeared on the Internet in March this year. Zawahiri dismissed Fadl's flip-flop as a conspiracy, an attempt by the usual enemies of Islam -- the United States, the West, Jews, and the apostate rulers of the Muslim world -- to undermine jihadi revivalism.

This is familiar territory. Bin Laden likens al-Qaida's 'resistance' to the Muslims' fight against invading Mongols in the thirteenth century and the Allies' stand against Hitler in World War Two and upholds that the unit under attack is the entire global community of Muslims (the 'umma'). Al-Qaida is presented as the 'vanguard group' willing to defend the community and bear the burdens of jihad. This is very difficult to justify morally and religiously when most of the victims of al-Qaida-related violence are Muslim civilians, which alienates the popular support that bin Laden and Zawahri see as crucial to the success of their jihad.

It may be futile entering a philosophical argument with two men so committed to violence. Yet the apparent U-turn of jihad's doctrinaire is a coup for the West. However, nombrilism will unlikely be on al-Qaida's agenda. Bruce Hoffman, a professor of security studies at Georgetown University, tells Wright that Fadl's renunciation of violence may instead ratchet up the pressure on al-Qaida to do something enormous this year. Hani el-Sibai, a Zawahiri loyalist who now runs a political Web site in London, agrees. He says of Fadl: "Do you think any Islamic group will listen to him? No. They are in the middle of a war."