Using the 'Anbar model'

With insurgent attacks and coalition casualties near all-time highs in Iraq, Washington hopes that its ongoing initiative to arm Sunni leaders in Anbar province to fight 'al-Qaida in Mesopotamia' militants will be effective.  The top US commander in Iraq, General David Petraeus, claims that the plan has already created a "stunning reversal" in the province's cycle of violence.  However, over the medium-term it is likely to plunge Iraq deeper into chaos.

High hopes

The programme's initial progress has heartened the US military:

• In most months since the 2003 invasion, approximately one-third to one-half of US casualties were suffered in al-Anbar.

• In May, only 12 US soldiers were killed in al-Anbar, less than 10% of the 124 total US fatalities suffered across the country -- the third highest monthly death toll of the war.

Potential dangers

But the United States could be adding fuel to the fire.  The Anbar model marks a U-turn away from the Bush administration's prior strategy of disarming militias and building a stable, sovereign, democratic Iraq by bolstering the authority of the central government.  Anbar's Sunni leaders may turn their new firepower on Shia militias, Iraqi security personnel, or coalition forces rather than foreign insurgents.  Instead of promoting a government monopoly on force, Washington may be creating an archipelago of new warlords.

Afterward… more fighting?

There are strong doubts about the role Sunni armed groups will play over the medium term, even if they succeed in crushing al-Qaida in the province.  It is very unlikely that they will feel any sense of loyalty to the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad.  Instead, the Anbar model appears likely to accelerate the disintegration of Iraq into armed sectarian fiefs -- a recipe for continued violence.