Russia's radar diplomacy

US President George Bush has plenty of food for thought ahead of his meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in early July. Bush has been wrong footed by Putin's proposal to base elements of the US anti-missile defence in Azerbaijan instead of the Czech Republic. He will turn down the offer -- as politely as possible.

The proposal, made on the first day of the G8 summit in Heiligendamm, will have baffled Bush. This was understandable, as it was the first 'conciliatory' gesture on Russia's part since Putin's aggressive speech at a Munich security conference in February. There, Putin lambasted the United States for unconstrained hyper-use of force. And in an interview prior to the G8 summit, Putin derided some of Russia's "partners" as "incompetent" and warned Moscow might reposition its missiles to target Europe. 

Putin's proposal was therefore a carefully orchestrated diplomatic initiative rather than a knee-jerk move. Having inflated fears of a possible return to Cold War rhetoric, Russia then made an offer of cooperation. It hoped to be seen as an equal of the United States, cooperating not out of weakness and desperation, as it did throughout the 1990s, but of its own free will.

Russia had even conducted negotiations with Azerbaijan to request its permission for the joint use of the Gabala radar station a month before making the announcement at Heiligendamm. This degree of planning suggests that Moscow is less reckless and antagonistic in its behaviour towards the West than is often assumed.

Washington has repeatedly said that the missile defence system is not aimed at Russia; it is designed at warding off threats from Iran. To Russia, these arguments are hollow because of the lack of trust in the United States and in view of Washington's willingness to locate the bases in Eastern Europe.

Baku has for over a decade pursued a carefully balanced foreign policy, seeking to accommodate both Washington and Moscow. Moreover, the Gabala radar station is one of the most powerful in the world, capable of surveying the entire southern hemisphere. It covers Iran but not Russia.

'No thanks'

The issue of technical feasibility -- deploying an old Soviet radar -- is largely irrelevant, as Moscow's primary aim is to test US intentions. Washington will reiterate that it still sees Eastern Europe as the best location to pre-empt missile threats from Iran and the Middle East.

If Washington bluntly rejects the proposal, the Kremlin will conclude that the ultimate goal of the US' anti-missile system is to encircle Russia. Recriminations, coupled with some hostile military gestures, such as the withdrawal from the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and a gradual military build-up on Russian borders, would then ensue.

Washington could choose to respond with subtlety, integrating the Gabala radar into the Eastern European system or giving Russia a greater opportunity to voice its concerns in the NATO-Russia Council. However, if past behaviour is of any use to assessing future conduct, then it can be said with a degree of certainty that the Bush administration will press on with its initial plan, displaying little sensitivity to security concerns of a struggling 'great power'.