Sarkozy's European gamble

French President Nicolas Sarkozy, whose experience is almost entirely in domestic policy, is about to discover European politics.

This week, Sarkozy will continue his drive to win approval at the European Union summit on June 21-22 for his pared-down treaty to replace the bloc's stalled constitution project. Success will be the icing on his party's expected landslide win at the first round of French parliamentary elections on June 10. But even though Sarkozy's mini-treaty looks like a winner, it will be a hard sell in a hostile Europe.

Tidying up the treaty

Since the French and the Dutch rejected the European Constitutional Treaty in 2005, the development of European institutions has stagnated. The continent urgently needed a senior dignitary to pick up the pieces and put together something that everyone could live with.

Sarkozy will not plan anything as ambitious as the Constitutional Treaty. He has no wish to spoil the honeymoon of his early presidency with another referendum and the UK government would be even less enthusiastic. Rather he envisages a 'tidying-up' that settles the main institutional issues. And at a glance, Sarkozy's first European initiative looks promising. His proposed changes will include:

• a more stable presidency of the European Council to replace the current six monthly rotating system;
• a foreign minister, though with probably limited powers;
• changes to the voting system on the Council of Ministers to take better account of member states' populations than the current system signed at Nice in 2000, whereby the number of votes allocated to each country is weighted in favour of smaller countries;
• some extension of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), notably into issues such as immigration and justice, which previously required unanimity among all Council members; and
• some reference -- as yet undefined – to the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

France is uniquely well placed to propose this sort of 'mini-treaty'. The Germans, though they will preside at the EU summit where the constitution will dominate the agenda, have already ratified the constitutional treaty, as have the Italians. The United Kingdom, by contrast, is too Eurosceptic to qualify as a serious institutional draftsman.

Likely frustrations

Sarkozy's first difficulty will lie with the Germans. They feel that the 2004 treaty already embodies a compromise, in which some of their more federalist instincts were sacrificed to French intergovernmentalism. Chancellor Angela Merkel has already made it clear that she that she wants to keep as much of the existing treaty as possible. For example, Berlin remains attached to the existent Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The sole new element Sarkozy wishes to put into the equation -- an 'economic governance' of the Eurozone (in effect, political control of the European Central Bank) -- is also likely to be anathema to the Germans. Central bank independence within the framework of an anti-inflation mission has been an article of faith for them since the early days of the Deutschmark.

But any deal to satisfy the Germans could prove unacceptable to the United Kingdom. Prime Minister Tony Blair and his heir apparent Gordon Brown want a minimal document that they can slip through Parliament with as little fuss as possible. However, any concessions on the Charter of Rights or the extension of QMV procedures, will offer an open goal for David Cameron's Eurosceptic Conservative opposition at the most delicate moment of the Blair-Brown transition.

There will be other voices of dissent in the coming weeks. Austrian Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer has muttered that he does not wish countries that have refused the treaty to call the shots. Commission President Jose Manuel Durao Barroso has also observed that no consensus has been reached over a new mini-treaty, a remark that does not sound like that of a committed facilitator.

Sarkozy will be a cogent, patient, and committed salesman for his proposals. But disagreements with some EU partners over the substance of mini-treaty may make it difficult to mobilise Europe's coalition of no-sayers and non-ratifiers.