Turkey's arrested accession

Anger is growing in Ankara over the partial suspension of EU accession negotiations following Turkey’s failure to meet a deadline to open its ports and airports to ships and planes from Cyprus. It could intensify dramatically this week if Cyprus exercises its right to block all accession negotiations.

On balance, this appears unlikely: the European Commission recommended last week that talks be suspended on eight of the 35 accession ‘chapters’, and the Council of Ministers will probably endorse the move at the start of next week.

This outcome would be far short of the much feared ‘train crash’ -- the image evoked by EU leaders to describe a situation in which, due to Ankara’s non-compliance, Turkey’s accession talks run into the buffers and are derailed, perhaps permanently. The EU realises there is too much at stake to allow that:

• Turkey’s economy is still fragile, despite strong growth and slower inflation. The lira would suffer in the event of too severe (and final) a signal on accession prospects.
• Popular support for the EU is rapidly dwindling. If it continues, it might soon sap the will of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government to implement controversial EU-mandated reforms.

Brussels has limited the suspension to talks on specific topics in an effort to limit damage to the wider cause of (eventually) bringing Ankara into the EU fold. ‘Talks about talks’ will continue on the immediate issue of opening Turkish ports and airports to Cyprus, though this is not in prospect absent a concession from the EU regarding the embargo on the Turkish Republic of Cyprus.

Yet the exercise in damage limitation disguises neither the difficulties that lie ahead in Turkish-EU relations nor the high stakes involved. In important respects, the momentum is running in the wrong direction and will not easily be reversed:

Cyprus

Ankara’s commitment to Turkish Cyprus as presently constituted is not negotiable as long as there is no backing from the Greek side for an internationally approved settlement of the island’s division:

• A solution was set out in the Annan plan, which Turkish Cypriots approved by referendum in 2004 but their Greek counterparts rejected.
• The (Greek) Republic of Cyprus, the island’s only internationally recognised politically entity, became an EU member the same year.
• It has consequently acquired a veto during all major stages of negotiations between the EU and Turkey.

Turkish politics

Popular disillusion with the EU is feeding into domestic politics, where longstanding tensions between the civilian and military authorities are increasing in the run up to presidential elections in May and parliamentary elections in November:

• Prior to the introduction of EU-mandated reforms, the military was closely involved in political decision-making. Formally, this is a thing of the past.
• Yet under General Yasar Buyukanit, their new commander, the armed forces may become more rather than less assertive in their role as guardians of the secular constitution. The Islamist origins and perceived religious agenda of Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) trouble the high command.
• In this context, Erdogan’s expected bid for the presidency next year points to trouble. The military may be less inclined to worry about the impact on EU relations of any move it makes to ‘defend the constitution.’

Turkish ‘destiny’

Pope Benedict XVI’s visit to Turkey last week brought to the fore broader questions about the country’s role as the crossroads between Europe and Asia, and the relationship between Islam and Christianity and secular and religious power. Turkish accession to the EU would promise to offer at least a partial answer to some of these questions. It could show how democracy, secularism, and Islam can cohabit within a much wider community composed of member states and populations drawn from a very different cultural background. It is an audacious enterprise, which this week’s suspension of negotiations will temporarily shunt into a siding.