Pragmatic Gates at Defense

The Senate Armed Services Committee’s hearings on whether to confirm Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense, scheduled to begin on Monday December 4, mark the return of a canny bureaucratic operator to the international stage. The Committee is likely to quiz Gates, a career CIA analyst who served as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) under the first President George Bush, about his ability to give his superiors candid advice and challenge entrenched policies. While this may be politically expedient, it is also beside the point:

• Gates will not be able to force change within the administration; his return was never likely to have a sudden, transformative effect on US policy in Iraq, the wider Middle East, or military ‘transformation’.
• Its real significance will become apparent only gradually, as the process of military and strategic policy deliberation, debate and execution improves under a more competent steward.

Worldview and policy

Gates’s background suggests that he has a solid understanding of the uses and limitations of military power. This perspective will gratify the uniformed military, and inject a welcome cautionary note into the administration’s policy discussions:

• While often described as a ‘realist’ -- one who emphasises the importance of balance-of-power politics in foreign relations -- Gates is also cognisant of the powerful role ‘world opinion’ can exercise in international relations.
• Most importantly, he is not an ideologue, and frequently credits political leaders from both parties for helping to achieve US ‘victory’ in the Cold War.

In practical terms, this outlook will affect policy in three ways.

Analyst’s perspective

As a former analyst within the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence, and experienced bureaucratic manager, Gates prefers to emphasise pragmatic solutions over ideologically-driven policies. He believes that the key to the success of US foreign and military policy is a balance between diplomatic conciliation and military assertiveness.

Cautious approach

Before being named DCI, Gates served as deputy national security advisor under the elder Bush. Gates assiduously factors ‘sub-optimal’ outcomes into his policy recommendations.

Engaging enemies

While Gates believes that a US emphasis on human rights and democracy can bring to bear powerful pressure on its antagonists, he believes that effective diplomacy always entails engagement with US enemies. In 2004, he joined with Carter’s national security advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, in calling on the administration to engage in direct talks with Iran.

First priorities

After his confirmation by the Senate, Gates’s first priorities will be to:

• address the increasingly unfavourable military situation in Iraq;
• prepare for military contingencies associated with the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programmes; and
• assess the progress and efficacy of the Pentagon’s military ‘transformation’ agenda.

Expectations in Congress and the media of rapid progress in each of these areas are overblown. Though he could favour wholesale implementation of the strategic adjustments in Iraq that former Secretary of State James Baker’s Iraq Study Group may recommend, or direct talks with Tehran, neither of these events is likely. However, Gates, backed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, will have an immediate impact on the policy-making process, perhaps allowing for a more open-minded, pragmatic approach to future challenges.