Has Chavez gone too far?

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has spent substantial time and money pursuing a policy of oil diplomacy, both globally and closer to home. Yet much of this energy appears to have been misspent, even though he is almost certain to win the presidential election on Sunday, December 3.

Within Latin America, Venezuela has established the PetroCaribe plan, which promises discounted oil to 15 Caribbean nations, as well as setting up arrangements to exchange fuel for Cuban doctors to work in poor Venezuelan neighbourhoods. On a grander scale, Chavez’s proposed ‘great southern gas pipeline’ would link Venezuela, Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina and Uruguay via a 9,000 kilometre pipeline to supply Venezuelan gas to its southern neighbours. All of this largesse has produced modest results:

• Trade pact

  Although Cuba and Bolivia have signed up to Chavez’s Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), an alliance aiming to counter the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas, broader support remains elusive, with no regional heavyweight demonstrating interest in the project. Even the grandiose gas pipeline project appears to have foundered under the weight of political complications and the logistical and financial difficulties it poses -- not least, doubts surrounding Venezuela’s capacity to increase its hitherto meagre gas output sufficiently to supply the pipeline.

• Mercosur blocked

  While Venezuela’s entry into the Mercosur bloc at the end of 2005 represented a gain for Venezuelan diplomacy, irritation on the part of Mercosur’s largest members, Argentina and Brazil, over Chavez’s interference in the Southern Cone (especially Bolivia) suggests that Caracas’s membership will only serve to weaken an already fractured bloc.

Making enemies

At the same time, Chavez’s increasingly vociferous anti-US rhetoric and intervention in the domestic affairs of his neighbours has proved largely counterproductive:

• While candidates defined as Chavez allies have won recent elections in Nicaragua and Ecuador (both negligible players in regional geopolitics), his blatant efforts to influence the outcome of the Peruvian presidential elections were a major factor in the defeat of his chosen candidate, Ollanta Humala. Chavez now enjoys the animosity of Peruvian President Alan Garcia, himself otherwise seen as part of the centre-left rising in the region. Similar efforts to boost Mexican opposition candidate Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador have created frosty relations with Mexico and its incoming government which will not be rapidly overcome.
• In mid-October, Chilean President Michelle Bachelet requested the replacement of the Venezuelan ambassador to Caracas, after the ambassador made public comments on domestic political issues, including criticisms of the Christian Democrat party, a member of the governing coalition.
• More recently, the Venezuelan ambassador to Argentina was removed after complaints over his ‘active diplomacy’, including financing for radical social movements and efforts to divide the Argentine government with respect to recent allegations of Iranian involvement in a 1994 Buenos Aires bombing. Public statements of support for Tehran by a -- now sacked -- member of the cabinet were reportedly orchestrated by the Venezuelan embassy. President Nestor Kirchner has thus far been one of Chavez’s most significant allies in Latin America, and the rupture will not work to Chavez’s benefit.

Brazilian ambivalence

Among the large economies, only Brazil currently appears to represent a serious ally, although this relates largely to President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s need to pay lip service to left-wing sectors at home who would prefer Chavez’s radical approach to Lula’s hitherto prudent policies. Indeed, Brasilia has done little to disguise its irritation over Venezuela’s role in the nationalisation of Bolivian hydrocarbons, which hit Brazil and its state oil company, Petrobras, especially hard.

UN mis-step

The clearest sign of Chavez’s misguided foreign policy was his failure to win a non-permanent UN Security Council seat in October, despite an unprecedented deployment of diplomatic firepower including a marathon of state visits around the world and the promise of financial aid and subsidised oil. Chavez’s controversial speech [English translation, not verified] before the UN General Assembly in September, in which he referred to President George Bush as ‘the devil’, was regarded as a step too far by many Latin American governments, who questioned whether Caracas would represent regional interests on the Council, as opposed to using it as a venue for anti-Bush diatribes. A range of last-minute regional abstentions eventually forced both Venezuela and US-backed Guatemala to bow out in favour of Panama.

Trouble at home

At home, too, there are signs that high-profile diplomacy and overseas largesse have won him few friends. Although Chavez retains substantial support, owing in large part to the use of oil revenues to finance social programmes, there are signs that many would prefer to see the president spend more time and money in Venezuela, where social needs remain pressing. His oil diplomacy appears to carry a far higher cost than is justified by the results, and Chavez is likely to find himself increasingly isolated during a new presidential mandate in which a falling oil price may make him more vulnerable both at home and abroad.