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Utilising our contributor network of world-class scholars, including some with years of experience ‘on the ground’ in Iraq, OA’s Daily Brief coverage has predicted the spiralling sectarian violence, swelling insurgency, and US military setbacks of the past two years.
Unlike most media outlets, OA’s Iraq assessments have not varied in line with temporary spikes or lulls in violence. In January 2006, when a temporary fall in sectarian killings suggested that the US military was beginning to get a grip on the security situation, OA’s analysis offered a bleaker forecast:
Insurgent groups became increasingly adaptive and lethal in 2005. Increasing civilian deaths from insurgent attacks, and polling data indicating that Iraqis feel increasingly insecure, suggest that US forces will be unable to crush the insurgency and withdraw significant numbers of troops this year.OADB, January 20, 2006, I
Likewise, OA correctly predicted that the outcome of the December 2005 Iraqi elections would exacerbate, rather than alleviate, sectarian tensions:
The outcome of December's election provides further confirmation that the country's political future is in the hands of the leaders of the three large sectarian or ethnic coalitions. Sectarianism has become the only possible basis for forming a national government in Iraq, with the inevitable consequence that it will have neither the inclination nor the capacity to enforce its will, equally, over all Iraqis. OADB, February 14, 2006, I
These trends developed as anticipated. By mid-year Washington was confronting tit-for-tat killings by sectarian militias and death squads. US military leaders hoped to restore order by concentrating more US and Iraqi forces in the vicinity of Baghdad. However, conditions on the ground suggested that the new plan (Operation Forward Together) would fail:
Amid rampant sectarian and anti-occupation violence, the boosted US military presence in Baghdad represents the best chance gradually to check chronic insecurity there. However, it will have some counter-productive consequences. Significant US force reductions are very unlikely this year. OADB, August 30, 2006, II
Following this setback, and the Republican defeat in the US mid-term elections, President George Bush embarked on a strategic assessment. The media focussed on the deliberations of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group (ISG), which delivered its recommendations to the White House in December. However, OA recognised that Bush would largely ignore the ISG plan…
The ISG report will give plentiful ammunition to Bush's political opponents in Washington, but it is unlikely to have a dramatic impact on US policy…. The administration will likely… undermine or ignore elements of the ISG report that do not match its priorities. OADB, December 7, 2006, I
…in favour of an internally-generated administration strategy:
Despite mounting congressional pressure to scale back the US military presence in Iraq, President George Bush has chosen to increase US troop levels and reconstruction assistance. The plan reflects the White House view that 'defeat' in Iraq would be a strategic disaster… OADB, January 15, 2007, I
This negative scenario has begun to play out in-line with OA’s bleak assessment; as it became apparent that there were still insufficient US troops to restore order…
The attacks show that the US troop ‘surge’ is not yet having a significant impact on attacks in Baghdad, and may be displacing the focus of violence to other regions. OADB, March 7, 2007, I
…the Iraqi authorities remained incapable of competently performing the most basic infrastructure-maintenance, let alone capitalising on the political ‘window of opportunity’ provided by the US security plan..
Institutional paralysis in the short-term appears to be more than just a security problem. Bottlenecks, such as inconsistent reporting procedures between ministries, use of differing spending instructions by ministries and provinces, misappropriation of allocated funds and poor maintenance of cash ledgers, would persist even under normal conditions… On the expenditure side, the prospects for the 2007 budget look similar to 2006, with the Iraqi bureaucracy unlikely to be able to spend the money it has been allocated. OADB, March 13, 2007, III
…and violence continued to spiral.
At least 103 US soldiers have been killed in Iraq this month, making April one of the deadliest periods for the US military. President George Bush's troop 'surge' plan to restore order appears to have somewhat curtailed sectarian violence in Baghdad, but overall fatalities among US troops and Iraqi civilians have remained steady or actually risen… previously 'secure' areas, such as Diyala province, have experienced a surge in violence. OACES, April 30, 2007, IV
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