Analysis
Officially, Kim died of a heart attack, like his late father. There had been no report of extended hospitalisation or major health procedures leading up to today's announcement.
Rushed succession plans
Consolidating the succession of his son, Kim Jong-un (who is in his 20s), was one of Kim Jong-il's key goals over the past couple of years (see NORTH KOREA: Regime collapse poses top long-term risk - October 3, 2011). Kim Jong-un has received a crash course on leadership and had his name floated in propaganda as a "Brilliant Young General" and "New Star General". Kim Jong-il finally showcased his son at a rare conference of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) in September 2010, when it was reported that Kim Jong-un had been appointed a four-star general and vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission.
The transition will probably win the support of key stakeholders in the system. Kim Jong-un's uncle, Jang Song-taek, a longtime confidante of Kim Jong-il, will act as a powerful adviser and 'regent'.
However, there are several risks:
- He is young and wholly untried.
- His grooming for succession falls far short of his father's decades-long apprenticeship.
- He has no known skills or achievements, leading to resentment about his selection and lack of confidence in his ability.
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The elite have held together thus far, but may be loath to entrust their future to an inexperienced youth
No viable alternatives
The only alternatives to Kim Jong-un would be collective leadership or another strongman coming to power through a coup. North Korea's government is not only a dynasty but an extreme cult bordering on theocracy. Any challenger to Kim Jong-un must bear the burden of 66 years of rule under the Kim family. It is unlikely that such an alternative leader would be able to keep the system together. North Korea has no history of power-sharing and it is doubtful that such an arrangement could survive over the longer term. Without a dominant arbiter to manage competing interests and make controversial policy decisions, it is unlikely regime unity could be maintained for long.
Military onboard
The military was given a more visible political role under Kim Jong-il, but always remained under the control of the Kim family and the WPK, which has been partly revivified since September 2010.
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The military is unlikely to challenge or subvert the Kim Jong-un regime in the short term
Not all military leaders are hardliners, but they do have a vested interest in the military-industrial complex. Cabinet technocrats would prefer reform, but are weak. The WPK and the military could clash, but the National Defence Commission will likely smooth the transition and ensure continuity.
Provocations likely
There is a risk that Pyongyang will engage in provocations resembling those last year, when the North attacked South Korean military assets, as Kim Jong-un attempts to show his mettle. He may also seek to provoke Seoul and Washington with another ballistic missile or nuclear test as early as next year.
However, Pyongyang may postpone such moves in the run-up to major celebrations -- April 15, 2012 is the centenary of the birth of Kim Il-sung and, according to propaganda, 2012 will be the year the destitute country becomes a "powerful and prosperous state".
It may merely be a matter of timing: over the past 20 years, provocations have proven the steadiest route to much-needed economic aid from Seoul, Washington and Beijing. In the event of such provocations, Seoul and (especially) Washington will prefer crisis management or damage control to escalation, for both are preoccupied with presidential elections in 2012.
Seoul will watch and wait
Seoul has long grown averse to escalation of tension with Pyongyang. It will likely take a wait-and-see posture as it braces for a general election in April and a presidential election in December 2012. South Korea has accrued too much wealth over the past generation to risk it in an open flare-up with Pyongyang. The younger generation of South Koreans will not support any military operations to destabilise the North Korean regime.
Longer term, President Lee Myung-bak 's hardline policies have backfired, bolstering China's heft in Pyongyang. Whoever succeeds him will re-engage.
No unification
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Collapse of the Kim regime would be a necessary condition for reunification, but would not make it likely
Neither side is remotely ready for unification, despite decades of rhetoric and symbolic gestures. The economic, political and cultural gulf between the two Koreas vastly exceeds that between East and West Germany, or even China and Hong Kong. South Korea lacks both the resources and the will to govern the North in what would amount to a de facto occupation. The hope will be for stability in the first instance, followed by amenability.
Beijing will press its agenda
China has always supported the status quo, preventing the destabilisation of North Korea. To this end, it will see Kim's death as a chance to press the new leadership, whoever it be, not to do anything rash (for Beijing will not cover for them if they do) and to adopt market reforms.
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China's own new leadership, expected to emerge in late 2012, will try to forge close relations with Pyongyang
A key risk is that Beijing has its own set of contingency plans for breakdown scenarios inside North Korea -- while Seoul and Washington have another. So far as is known, they have not discussed these together.
Little prospect of fundamental change
Kim Jong-un's personal views on key policy areas, such as security and economic reform, are entirely unknown. He might recognise that Pyongyang's current path is unsustainable and push -- with Chinese encouragement -- for limited market reforms (see NORTH KOREA: Rejection of reform raises risks - May 26, 2011).
However, North Korea is built on the foundation of the cult of Kim Il-sung, descent from whom is Kim Jong-un's sole source of legitimacy. For Kim Jong-un, to distance himself from the legacy of his father and grandfather is to repudiate the inheritance on which his position depends.
