The rebels' dramatic occupation of Tripoli has broken the back of the Qadhafi regime and paved the way for rebuilding a state and society shackled by more than 40 years of personal dictatorship. Yet huge challenges lie ahead, even as much of the country celebrates 'liberation'. Substantial pockets of resistance have yet to be subdued, and the rebel victory will remain incomplete as long as Qadhafi and leading members of his family remain at large. While there is a sense in which Libya is on the brink of a promising new start, there is a risk that it could slip into chaos and division, posing huge security problems for the region.
In this special conference call, Oxford Analytica's Senior Global Advisors, Philip Mudd and Michael Crawford, and Libya specialist Richard Barltrop assessed the outlook for the country under its new leaders and examined the prospects for national construction and the role of the international community. Key questions included the attitude of the new government towards the oil and gas sector, and the status of existing contracts. Consideration was given to the political orientation of the post-Qadhafi government, and whether it will favour those countries that supported it as it swept to power. A major question on the experts’ minds was whether the mistakes of reconstruction in Iraq can be avoided.
Call Summary
Strong regime - weak state
As opposed to Tunisia, the situation in Libya has been that of the removal of a strong regime within a weak state. State structures were feeble when Muammar al-Qadhafi seized power in 1969, and he did his best to keep them fluid and incoherent. The elite operated with extreme informality, and many of the most powerful figures acted outside the ministerial framework of government. Qadhafi himself held no official government or state position.
Insurgency risk
The Transitional National Council (TNC) performed well in taking power in Tripoli; its activities were well coordinated and planned. However, unity in opposition and retaining unity in power are different matters, and there is now a risk of continued insurgency based around Tripoli and further afield. This risk places a premium on:
- TNC unity;
- the maintenance of law and order;
- implementation of a policy of reconciliation;
- the introduction of a pluralistic political roadmap;
- a fair distribution of revenues and provision of services; and
- the recovery by the state of a monopoly on force.
If Qadhafi is not captured promptly, a well-funded and well-developed insurgency can be expected. The number of sensitive economic assets—including oil, gas and roads—make the country vulnerable to a fast-moving and well-armed insurgent movement. Some level of armed opposition can be expected in the short term, but intelligence operations to track these down are likely to be aggressive and successful.
Oil facilities and Western companies would be key targets for insurgents, since the capture or destruction of these would destabilise the TNC. The insurgency is likely to stem from tribes and families of those who were recently in power, and who have access to weapons stores and communication networks that NATO would find difficult to track.
New government and policy change
The informality of the government under Qadhafi’s regime will work in the TNC’s favour, as there are no constitutional barriers restricting change. However, the TNC will have to start from the beginning—with state institutions and the creation of a civil society, which will demand significant external technical support.
There is the potential for factionalism and feuding between various elements, as the TNC has not succeeded in bringing all militia groups under its organisational control. Thus, it may prove difficult to impose central authority. It is unlikely that any incoming government will revise all the policies of the Qadhafi regime, so a transformed environment should not be expected. It will likely be years before any new bureaucratic habits form.
In the immediate future, the TNC will be concerned with dealing with Qadhafi, before focusing more broadly on corruption, which will generate considerable uncertainty for foreign business interests. The TNC will also be preoccupied with pressing humanitarian issues related to food, water, power and fuel, and will most likely rely heavily on immediate external assistance. It has a specific timetable in place, which includes the drafting of a constitution and the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections. Practically, this means that the TNC will be in power for around a year before its dissolution on the first convening of parliament.
Oil and gas
Estimates suggest that it will take two or three years before oil production returns to its peak of 1.6 million barrels/day. Currently, production is as low as 50,000 barrels/day, with no exports. By the end of the year, Libya may be able to produce up to 450,000 barrels/day. Production could also be swiftly resumed in the western fields, which should bring in enough revenue to finance the transition. The main damage has been caused to the mature fields in the west Sirte basin, and this will take time to repair. The TNC has been clear that it welcomes the return of foreign companies and will honour existing contracts. However, it will not want to engage in brokering new contracts at this point, as it is a caretaker administration and will want to avoid difficult decisions out of fear of being accused of corruption. The TNC has been making plans for the restoration of pipelines to Tobruk and elsewhere, and should be able to arrange for repairs of the western oilfields within six months.
Lessons on turning battlefield intelligence into action
The military struggle in Libya witnessed a rapid evolution of battlefield intelligence into action. This will have huge implications for the future. In particular, the rapid integration of intelligence and communications technology into special operations was striking. There are implications for defence software and defence infrastructure more broadly. The mission has been relatively simple thus far, especially compared to Afghanistan and Iraq.
Lessons from the NATO intervention for other parts of the world
Events in Libya have shown the international community that successful interventions are possibly without deploying significant ground forces. This will have major implications for the regimes in Syria and, in the longer term, Iran and North Korea. There has been little complaint on the international stage about the execution of aerial strikes on individual targets, and criticism over the ‘regime change’ aspects of the mission has been overcome relatively easily. Theoretically, this means that a similar intervention could take place in Syria. However, in contrast to Libya, there is no appetite for such action—either in the United States or the Arab world.
State building, reconstruction and reconciliation
Libyans see themselves as responsible for the process of reconstruction. Political challenges are inevitable over the next 12 months, especially over how the TNC should handle the emergence of political blocs and the path to elections. Divisions and tensions have existed from the beginning of the TNC, for example between the 17 February Shabab and the 17 February Alliance, the two blocs that competed for control of the revolution. Several blocs are likely to emerge along the lines of:
- the ‘original’ revolutionaries;
- ‘early’ defectors and ‘late’ defectors from the Qadhafi regime; and
- forces from the western Berber region of Jebel Nafusa.
Islamist participation in government is a major issue for debate. Libyan Islamists have supported the revolution and have talked of participating in democratic processes. The al-Qaida-linked Libyan Islamic Fighting Group is designated a terrorist organisation by Washington and allies; however, Western powers will need to tolerate their participation in government.
In terms of reconciliation, a blanket amnesty will not be acceptable to those who suffered under the old regime, and could lead to future instability. On the other hand, the exclusion and prosecution of everyone connected to Qadhafi-era crimes would be impractical and exclude the entire older generation. A compromise solution will need to be sought, and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission will be necessary.
The prospects for stability are better in Libya than in Egypt or Yemen because Libya has the economic resources to provide jobs for its population. TNC officials have promised to spend much more on domestic infrastructure than Qadhafi did. This will be the only way the government can provide the jobs needed to ensure stability.
